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Abstract The insurance industry currently discusses to which extent they can
integrate an illiquidity premium into their best estimate considerations of insurance
liabilities. The present position paper studies this question from an actuarial per-
spective that is based on market-consistent valuation. We conclude that mathe-
matical theory does not allow for discounting insurance liabilities with an illiquidity
spread.
1 An actuarial view on the illiquidity premium
1.1 Aim and organization of this position paper
The aim of this position paper is to analyze the application of an illiquidity premium
to discount the liability side of the balance sheet of an insurance company. We start
with an introduction to market-consistent actuarial valuation in Sect. 1.2. In
Sect. 1.3 we discuss the illiquidity premium from a rather non-mathematical
perspective and give arguments why it should not be used for the above purpose. In
Sect. 2 we present a simple model exemplifying the conclusions from Sect. 1.3.
1.2 Market-consistent actuarial valuation and regulation
The main task of an actuary is to predict and value insurance liability cash flows.
These predictions and valuations form the basis for premium calculations as well as
for solvency considerations of an insurance company. In most situations, insurance
cash flows are not traded on a market. Therefore, current accounting and solvency
regulation requires that these insurance cash flows are valued in a market-consistent
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mark-to-model approach. Article 75 of the Solvency II Framework Directive
(Directive 2009/138/EC) states ‘‘liabilities shall be valued at the amount for which
they could be transferred, or settled, between two knowledgeable willing parties in
an arm’s length transaction’’.
There is a consensus that (expected) insurance liability cash flows should be
replicated by appropriate financial instruments hedging financial risks by an optimal
asset allocation. The residual risks (between the expected values and the random
variables) ask for an additional risk margin for the risk bearing of the run-off of
these residual risks. The sum of these two elements (expected values and risk
margin) then corresponds to the technical provisions. This is described in Article 77
of the Solvency II Framework Directive as follows ‘‘The value of technical
provisions shall be equal to the sum of a best estimate and a risk margin … The best
estimate shall correspond to the probability-weighted average of future cash-flows,
taking account of time value of money (expected present value of future cash-
flows), using the relevant risk-free interest rate term structure. The calculation of the
best estimate shall be based upon up-to-date and credible information … The risk
margin shall be such as to ensure that the value of technical provisions is equivalent
to the amount that insurance and reinsurance undertakings would be expected to
require in order to take over and meet the insurance and reinsurance obligations.’’
The crucial question now is: what are admissible financial instruments for the
replication of (expected) insurance liability cash flows?
The aim of market-consistent actuarial valuation is to map the (expected)
insurance liability cash flows to financial instruments that have a reliable market
value (see also Article 77.4 of the Solvency II Framework Directive). That is, these
financial instruments should meet the following criteria (see Article TP.4.5 of the
QIS5 Technical Specifications Document):
(a) a large number of assets can be transacted without significantly affecting the
price of the financial instruments used in the replications (deep),
(b) assets can be easily bought and sold without causing a significant movement in
the price (liquid),
(c) current trade and price information are normally readily available to the public,
in particular to the undertakings (transparent).
If these criteria are not met then there are no reliable market values for these
financial instruments. Moreover, the above specifications mean that liquid
(corporate) bonds can be traded at any time and the bondholder does not need to
pursue a hold-to-maturity strategy in order to get a reasonable return on his
investment.
1.3 Illiquidity premium
It is exactly this hold-to-maturity argument that is debated by several (life)
insurance companies. They argue that insurance liabilities are illiquid and therefore
it should be allowed to integrate an illiquidity spread into the discount function for
these liabilities. They state: often insurance liability cash flows are highly
predictable and therefore they have all the features of illiquid long-term bonds.
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Thus, these liabilities could be replicated by illiquid bonds and, as a consequence,
these liabilities are valued at a much lower value because illiquidity massively beats
down the prices, see also Keller [2].
We outline, why this argument contradicts market-consistent actuarial valuation.
In this section we give rational arguments which will be mathematically supported
in Sect. 2.
We give the following counter-arguments:
• Valuation of insurance liability cash flows with illiquid bonds contradicts
market-consistent actuarial valuation because it corresponds to a hold-to-
maturity view, but market-consistent values are based on a transfer view (with
the appropriate reward for risk bearing). One may debate on a whole the concept
of market-consistent valuation in accounting, but once this framework is given
we are not allowed to measure some instruments by transfer values and others in
a hold-to-maturity view, because this will lead to a rather inconsistent full
balance sheet valuation that may allow for accounting arbitrage.
• The argument that insurance cash flows are predictable contradicts the very
notion of insurability. However, we could measure the degree of predictability
choosing an appropriate risk measure, but then this, of course, always depends
on the choice of the risk measure. Since we have infinitely many acceptable risk
measure choices we are again in an incomplete market setting which requires
more information about preferences of financial agents.
• There is no clear concept how the illiquidity spread is measured and
distinguished from the credit spread. Therefore, we can neither price this single
component in a market-consistent way, nor can we replicate it in an appropriate
way. Moreover, arguments that say that the illiquidity spread can be isolated and
hedged contradict the ‘‘law-of-one-price’’ assumption which also allows for
arbitrage.
• Often the degree of illiquidity is compared to a degree of predictability of
insurance liability cash flows. We are not aware of a theory that would allow for
a meaningful analysis.
• The general aim in market-consistent valuation is to replicate insurance
liabilities with financial instruments that have reliable market prices. Therefore,
we cannot choose illiquid instruments because their values are erratic and hence
the market-consistent value of the insurance liabilities becomes arbitrary.
We believe that if we respect the current accounting and solvency rules, market-
consistent actuarial valuation means that we need to replicate (expected) insurance
cash flows with financial instruments that have reliable prices and, thus, are traded
in deep, liquid and transparent financial markets (which excludes the illiquidity
premium). This has the following consequences:
• Liabilities are replicated by liquid financial instruments that have reliable prices.
• On the asset side of the balance sheet we may hold liquid and illiquid financial
instruments. If we hold illiquid instruments then they require a higher risk
capacity because of possible (further) deterioration of their prices (especially for
inter-temporal valuation according to the accounting time frame).
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• This higher risk capacity has to be viewed in the trade-off of a higher expected
return, see also (6) below. If the bearing of these illiquidity risks is rewarded, we
will have a financial gain in the future, if these risks are not rewarded we will
have a loss. This release of gains and losses will reveal over time according to
the economic developments and essentially depends on the accounting rules, e.g.
if the insurance companies have a yearly closing of their books, they give a
‘‘yearly solvency guarantee’’.
• If actuaries would value insurance liability cash flows with illiquid financial
instruments they would immediately release these possible future illiquidity
gains, see (7) below. That is, they would change the consumption stream of
possible losses and gains (in a non-market-consistent way, as we will see in
Sect. 2, below). This would contradict the actual solvency view because
insurance companies need to hold best estimates and a risk (prudence) margin
for possible adverse scenarios in a market-consistent 1-year view. That is, the
immediate release would give too low best estimates and would essentially
weaken the financial strength of the insurance companies which is neither in the
sense of the policyholder nor the aim of the regulator.
1.3.1 Conclusion
The existence of the illiquidity spread can be observed on the market and can as
well be incorporated in a theoretical model. However, under the current accounting
and solvency rules (market-consistent 1-year view) it can only be applied on the
asset side of the balance sheet (with an appropriate risk margin). If regulation
decides that also the liability side of the balance sheet can be discounted with the
illiquidity spread then one needs to change the accounting and solvency rules such
that they allow for a hold-to-maturity view (with all possible consequences), i.e. we
believe that it is not the task of the actuary to introduce fancy arguments for the
illiquidity discounting that circumvents the current regulation.
1.4 Current market situation and incentives in the future
A main trigger that has initiated the whole illiquidity premium discussion is the
problematic financial state of several life insurance companies. There are several
reasons for the financial distress situation of the life insurance market such as the
financial crisis, low interest rates, high guarantees and a high market competition. In
our opinion many of the sold insurance contracts were simply priced on a too low
level. The insurance industry now looks for instantaneous additional income and
gains through ‘‘smart’’ accounting in order to smooth this mis-pricing. Through the
introduction of an illiquidity premium, in-transparent concepts are applied to the
liability side of the balance sheet which are not really well understood. We believe
that this should not be done! In the past, mistakes have been made selling life
insurance contracts too cheaply. The solution to this problem should not be such as
to give incentives for future contracts to be priced too low as well. Introducing
illiquidity spread discounting on the liability side of the balance sheet could indeed
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lead to this undesirable effect. A more professional solution to the current problems
would be, for instance, to temporarily lower the security level for the solvency
considerations. For further discussions we also refer to Danielsson et al. [1].
2 A simple insurance model for spread analysis
In this section we study a simple model that highlights the issues of the previous
section from a more economic and mathematical point of view. The model stresses
the more methodological features as detailed practicality. The main findings will be
that the introduction of an illiquidity premium on the liability side of the balance
sheet changes the underlying consumption stream in a non-market-consistent way,
which gives wrong incentives in too low premiums and high risk appetite.
2.1 State price deflator modeling and default-free zero-coupon bonds
We define a financial market model that uses state price deflators for discounting,
see Wu¨thrich et al. [6] for an extended introduction and discussion. We choose a
filtered probability space ðX;F ;P;FÞ with finite time horizon n C 2 and discrete
time filtration F ¼ ðF tÞt¼0;...;n with F 0 ¼ f;; Xg: For the time grid we assume a
yearly time scale (as for accounting). Assume that w ¼ ðwtÞt¼0;...;n and v ¼
ðvtÞt¼0;...;n are two strictly positive and F-adapted stochastic processes. Moreover,
we assume that w0 = 1 and that vt is independent of rfF t1; wg with E½vt ¼ 1 for
all t. Then, we define the state price deflator u ¼ ðutÞt¼0;...;n; for t C 0, by
ut ¼ wt
Yt
u¼0
vu:
This state price deflator u has exactly the properties as defined in Chapter 2 of
Wu¨thrich et al. [6] and it can be used as a stochastic discount function for
(random) cash flows. The price of the default-free zero-coupon bond with
maturity m = 1, …, n at time t B m is then given by (see (2.47) in Wu¨thrich
et al. [6])
Pðt; mÞ ¼ 1
ut
E umjF t½ :
An explicit example is given by the discrete time one-factor Vasicek model in
Exercises 2.3 and 2.5 of Wu¨thrich et al. [6], see also Vasicek [4]. The crucial
property in the current model assumptions is the decoupling property of the state
price deflator u into two independent components w and v: We can interpret w as a
‘‘global market state price deflator’’ and v as idiosyncratic distortions, see also
Malamud et al. [3]. Independence and F-adaptedness imply
Pðt; mÞ ¼ 1
ut
E umjF t½  ¼
1
wt
E wmjF t½ : ð1Þ
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Proof of (1). Using the F-adaptedness of v implies
Pðt; mÞ ¼ 1
ut
E umjF t½  ¼
1
ut
E wm
Ym
u¼0
vu
" F t
#
¼ 1
wt
E wm
Ym
u¼tþ1
vu
" F t
#
:
To the last term we now apply the tower property for conditional expectations, see
Williams [5, p. 88],
E wm
Ym
u¼tþ1
vu
" F t
#
¼ E E wm
Ym
u¼tþ1
vu
" Fm1; w
#" F t
#
¼ E wm
Ym1
u¼tþ1
vuE vm½ jFm1; w
" F t
#
¼ E wm
Ym1
u¼tþ1
vuE vm½ 
" F t
#
¼ E wm
Ym1
u¼tþ1
vu
" F t
#
;
where in the second step we have used the adaptedness, in the third step the
independence and in the last step the normalization. Iteration of this argument for
s = t, …, m - 2 completes the proof of (1). h
Therefore, the price of the default-free zero-coupon bond is solely determined by
the stochastic process w: The stochastic process v will be used for price distortions
in defaultable zero-coupon bonds (leading to a possible illiquidity spread).
The continuously-compounded risk-free yield curve at time t for maturity m [ t
is given by
Rðt; mÞ ¼  1
m  t log Pðt; mÞ:
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
0 5 10 15
risk-free yield curve R(t,m)
Fig. 1 Continuously-compounded risk-free yield curve Rðt; mÞ in the discrete time one-factor Vasicek
model, see Exercises 2.3 and 2.5 of Wu¨thrich et al. [6], for parameters b = 0.005, b = 0.8, q = 0.008
and k = 8 at time t = 0 with initial spot rate r0 = 0.5%. For the explicit parametrization of the discrete
time one-factor Vasicek model we refer to Exercise 2.3 in Wu¨thrich et al. [6]
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This is the risk-free interest rate term structure for the calculation of the best
estimate, see also Sect. 1.2. An explicit example on the basis of the discrete time
one-factor Vasicek model is provided in Fig. 1.
2.2 Defaultable zero-coupon bonds and the corresponding spreads
We assume that defaultable zero-coupon bonds cannot recover after default and
there is also no recovery rate after default. We describe the default process C ¼
ðCtÞt¼0;...;n as follows: C is a non-increasing process with C0 ¼ 1 and for t [ 0
Ct ¼ 0 if the bond has defaulted in [0, t];1 if the bond has not defaulted in [0, t]:

Assumption We assume that the process C is F-adapted, independent of w and for
fixed p 2 ð0; 1Þ and s 2 ½0; 1Þ we have for all t [ 0
E CtjF t1; w½  ¼ ð1  pÞCt1; ð2Þ
E vtCtjF t1; w½  ¼ ð1  pÞð1  sÞCt1: ð3Þ
Interpretation From (2) we see that we have an annual default probability p 2
ð0; 1Þ: The second property (3) adds an illiquidity spread to the pricing of
defaultable zero-coupon bonds. Basically, for s [ 0 it means that vt and Ct are
negatively correlated, conditional on not having defaulted in [0, t - 1], which leads
to a lower price compared to s = 0. We refer s = 0 to a liquid bond and s [ 0 to an
illiquid bond, see also Fig. 2.
From a real-world probability measure P perspective, the default profile of C
does not depend on s 2 ½0; 1Þ; see (2).
The price of the defaultable zero-coupon bond with maturity m at time t B m is
given by, see also proof of (1),
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
0 5 10 15
default-free bond defaultable bond illiquid bond
Fig. 2 Continuously-compounded yield curves within the discrete time one-factor Vasicek model, see
also Fig. 1. The three curves correspond to the default-free yield curve Rð0; Þðp ¼ s ¼ 0Þ; defaultable
bond yield curve Yð0; Þ (only having credit spread p [ 0 and s = 0) and an illiquid bond yield curve
Yð0; Þ (having credit and illiquidity spread p, s [ 0)
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Bðt; mÞ ¼ 1
ut
E umCmjF t½  ¼
1
wt
E wm
Ym
u¼tþ1
vuCm
" F t
#
¼ 1
wt
E wm
Ym1
u¼tþ1
vuE vmCm½ jFm1; w
" F t
#
¼ ð1  pÞð1  sÞ 1
wt
E wm
Ym1
u¼tþ1
vuCm1
" F t
#
¼ . . . ¼ Pðt; mÞð1  pÞmtð1  sÞmtCt:
ð4Þ
Pricing formula (4) is the basic relation we will need in Sect. 2.3. We will also need
an analogous pricing formula for the case that the bond has survived up to time
k, i.e. conditional on the event fCk ¼ 1g: Then we have for k B t B m the pricing
formula
BðkÞðt; mÞ ¼ Pðt; mÞð1  pÞmtð1  sÞmtCðkÞt ; ð5Þ
where the probability law of CðkÞt corresponds to the conditional probability
PðCt 2 jCk ¼ 1Þ:
On the non-default set fCt ¼ 1g; for m [ t, the continuously-compounded yield
curve of the defaultable zero coupon is then given by, see (4),
Yðt; mÞ ¼  1
m  t log Bðt; mÞ ¼ Rðt; mÞ  logð1  pÞ  logð1  sÞ[ Rðt; mÞ:
Figure 2 provides an example within the discrete time one-factor Vasicek deflator
model.
2.3 Market-consistent solvency analysis
We now study a full balance sheet for an insurance company. We define a liability
and an asset portfolio and then value these in a market-consistent way.
2.3.1 Insurance liability cash flows
For the insurance liability cash flows we choose a very simple model. Assume that
the insurance liabilities are given by a default-free cash flow of size M = 1 at time
m = 2. This means that, for simplicity, the insurance technical risk is deterministic
(strictly speaking, this is not an insurance contract). Thus, we consider an example
with completely predictable insurance liability cash flow, and thus, this example
will also show that the predictability of insurance liability cash flows is not really
the issue in an illiquidity premium discounting analysis!
The time series of the market-consistent value of the liability side of the balance
sheet is given by
L0 ¼ Pð0; 2Þ; L1 ¼ Pð1; 2Þ; L2 ¼ 1 and Lt ¼ 0 for t 3:
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A (single pure risk) premium of p = L0 = P(0, 2) is charged to the policyholder at
time t = 0.
2.3.2 Asset side of the balance sheet and consumption stream
We put ourselves in the situation of the insurer who chooses the asset side of the
balance sheet with defaultable zero-coupon bonds that match the maturities of the
insurance liabilities. These are chosen such that the time series on the asset side of
the balance sheet always covers the market-consistent value of the insurance
liabilities. Since we only have defaultable zero-coupon bonds for the replication
(unavoidable market risk) we obtain a consumption stream C ¼ ðC0; C1; C2Þ that
balances losses and gains. One may debate the terminology consumption stream that
we have borrowed from economic literature. However, we believe that it nicely
illustrates the solvency picture.
Time t = 0. We choose the asset side of the balance sheet at time t = 0 to have
value (matching maturities)
A0 ¼ ð1  pÞ2ð1  sÞ2Bð0; 2Þ; i.e. this provides A0 ¼ L0 ¼ Pð0; 2Þ:
Since the policyholder exactly pays the premium p = P(0, 2), we get an initial
consumption C0 = 0.
Time t = 1. The asset portfolio with initial value A0 generates the value
A1
- = (1 - p)-2 (1 - s)-2 B(1, 2) at time t = 1. This value needs to be compared
to the value of the liabilities L1 = P(1, 2) at time t = 1. In order that these liabilities
are exactly covered at time 1 the insurance company obtains a consumption
C1 ¼ A1  L1 ¼ ð1  pÞ1ð1  sÞ1C1  1
h i
Pð1; 2Þ:
Note that this consumption can be positive or negative depending on the fact
whether the bond defaults, C1 ¼ 0; or whether it does not default, C1 ¼ 1: In the
case of default, the insurance company needs to inject capital L1. We assume this is
done through new (defaultable) bonds that have not defaulted yet. This provides,
after consumption, the value of the asset portfolio at time t = 1
A1 ¼ ð1  pÞ1ð1  sÞ1Bð1Þð1; 2Þ; i.e. this provides A1 ¼ L1 ¼ Pð1; 2Þ;
where B(1)(1, 2) is the price of a defaultable zero-coupon, conditional on the event
that it has not defaulted in the first period, see (5).
Time t = 2. This asset portfolio chosen at time 1 generates value A2
- = (1 - p)-1
(1 - s)-1 B(1)(2, 2) at time t = 2. This value needs to be compared to the liabilities
L2 = P(2, 2) = 1 at time t = 2. In order that these liabilities are covered at time 2 the
insurance company obtains a final consumption
C2 ¼ A2  L2 ¼ ð1  pÞ1ð1  sÞ1Cð1Þ2  1
h i
:
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Note that this consumption can again have both signs depending on the fact whether
the bond defaults, Cð1Þ2 ¼ 0; or whether it does not default, Cð1Þ2 ¼ 1; in the second
period.
2.3.3 Solvency under unlimited liability
We conclude that the insurance company faces the following consumption stream
C ¼ 0; ð1  pÞ1ð1  sÞ1C1  1
h i
Pð1; 2Þ; ð1  pÞ1ð1  sÞ1Cð1Þ2  1
h i 
:
If the insurance company completely meets this consumption stream C (i.e. cannot
execute a limited liability option) then solvency is guaranteed with probability 1. In
general, solvency is not guaranteed with probability 1, i.e. the insurance company
may execute the limited liability option if a Ct is too negative for some t = 0, 1, 2
(e.g. measured by a value-at-risk risk measure). Note that traditional solvency
definitions slightly differ from this view because here we interpret solvency capital
as an unlimited liability option. For the purpose of this paper this difference is not
important, but allows for a more clear description of the problem. In the present
example we assume for simplicity that there is no limited liability option, i.e. the
consumption stream C is completely met with probability 1. We can then easily
calculate the price at time t = 0 of this consumption stream C (see Theorem 2.5 in
Wu¨thrich et al. [6]). As a consequence of no-arbitrage, the price Q0[C] of the
consumption stream C at time 0 is given by, see Section 2.3 in Wu¨thrich et al. [6],
Q0½C ¼
X2
u¼0
E uuCu½  ¼ 0:
The consequence of this no-arbitrage pricing is that the asset-liability pair (A0, L0)
can be considered as a ‘‘fair’’ deal.
We can also study the expected gains generated by the consumption stream
C, they are
E½C0 ¼ C0 ¼ 0; E½C1 ¼ s
1  sE½Pð1; 2Þ  0 and E½C2 ¼
s
1  s  0: ð6Þ
This shows that investing in illiquid bonds s [ 0 is, on average, rewarded by a
positive consumption (but of course there is also a downside risk which results in
the no-arbitrage price Q0[C] = 0).
2.4 Illiquidity premium
In this subsection we demonstrate what happens if we also allow for discounting
with an illiquidity spread on the liability side of the balance sheet.
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2.4.1 Liability side of the balance sheet
Choose s 2 ð0; 1Þ; i.e. s [ 0. The time series of the spread discounted liabilities is
given by
eL0 ¼ ð1  sÞ2Pð0; 2Þ; eL1 ¼ ð1  sÞPð1; 2Þ; eL2 ¼ L2 ¼ 1 and
eLt ¼ 0 for t 3:
As in the previous example, we assume that we still charge the (single pure risk)
premium p ¼ L0 ¼ Pð0; 2Þ[ eL0 to the policyholder at time t = 0.
2.4.2 Asset side of the balance sheet and consumption stream
Next, we consider the consumption stream that balances losses and gains in this new
situation.
Time t = 0. We choose the asset side of the balance sheet at time t = 0 to be
eA0 ¼ ð1  pÞ2Bð0; 2Þ; i.e. this provides eA0 ¼ eL0 ¼ ð1  sÞ2Pð0; 2Þ:
Moreover, since the policyholder pays premium p = P(0, 2), we get a first (posi-
tive) consumption
eC0 ¼ p  eA0 ¼ ð2s  s2ÞPð0; 2Þ[ 0:
Time t = 1. This asset portfolio with initial value eA0 generates value eA1 ¼
ð1  pÞ2Bð1; 2Þ at time t = 1 that needs to be compared to the value of the liabilities
eL1 ¼ ð1  sÞPð1; 2Þ at time t = 1. The second consumption is then given by
eC1 ¼ eA1  eL1 ¼ ð1  pÞ1C1  1
h i
ð1  sÞPð1; 2Þ:
After this consumption, the asset portfolio at time t = 1 is given by
eA1 ¼ ð1  pÞ1Bð1Þð1; 2Þ; i.e. this provides eA1 ¼ eL1 ¼ ð1  sÞPð1; 2Þ;
under the side constraint that we have a bond that has not defaulted at time 1, i.e.
conditional on fC1 ¼ 1g:
Time t = 2. This asset portfolio eA1 generates value eA2 ¼ ð1  pÞ1Bð1Þð2; 2Þ and
provides a final consumption at time t = 2 given by
eC2 ¼ eA2  eL2 ¼ ð1  pÞ1Cð1Þ2  1
h i
:
2.4.3 Analysis of the new consumption stream
In this situation we have a new consumption stream
eC ¼ ð2s  s2ÞPð0; 2Þ; ð1  pÞ1C1  1
h i
ð1  sÞPð1; 2Þ; ð1  pÞ1Cð1Þ2  1
h i 
:
Under the unlimited liability assumption we again calculate its no-arbitrage price at
time t = 0:
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Q0½eC ¼
X2
u¼0
E uu eCu
h i
¼ 0:
The expected consumptions under the real-world probability measure P are given
by, s [ 0,
E½ eC0 ¼ eC0 ¼ ð2s  s2ÞPð0; 2Þ[ 0 and E½ eC1 ¼ E½ eC2 ¼ 0: ð7Þ
This shows that if we allow for an illiquidity premium discounting on the liability
side of the balance sheet all the expected (illiquidity) gains from periods t = 1, 2
(see (6)) are shifted to the first period t = 0, see (7). This implies that if we consume
these expected gains already in the first period, there is no reward for doing the risk
bearing of the run-off of the liabilities. Indeed, what happens in this situation is that
the insurance company consumes eC0 ¼ ð2s  s2ÞPð0; 2Þ[ 0 at the beginning and
after this consumption it remains with the asset-liability pair ð eA0; eL0Þ: This asset-
liability pair generates a consumption stream ð0; eC1; eC2Þ with market-consistent
value at time 0 given by, s [ 0,
Q0½ð0; eC1; eC2Þ ¼ ð2s  s2ÞPð0; 2Þ\0: ð8Þ
As a consequence of the over-consumption of capital in the first period, the
insurance company lacks capital to allow for a market-consistent transfer of its
business at a later period; hence violating the core idea of market-consistent
valuation and solvency!
Note that a similar picture is obtained if it charges a too low premium p\ P(0, 2).
Mis-pricing cannot be corrected by an aggressive asset strategy and smart
accounting.
2.5 Conclusions
The insurance companies should NOT integrate an illiquidity premium on the
liability side of the balance sheet. An illiquidity premium is in-consistent with
market-consistent actuarial valuation. It shifts possible future gains to the starting
point. Therefore, these possible gains are not consumed when they are due but rather
in the beginning, and the company is left with a negative market value, see (8). In
particular, this means that there is no risk margin left for the orderly run-off of the
insurance liabilities, which contradicts any regulatory effort. Moreover, it gives
wrong incentives for an over-aggressive consumption, a high risk appetite and too
low insurance premiums. Putting arguments together, it undermines adequate
insurance prices and a competitive well-functioning insurance market with a long-
term perspective.
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